Putin’s Pakistan puzzle

LAST week, Russian President Vladimir Putin talked on several geopolitical issues in St Petersburg, which also define Moscow’s approach to China, India and Pakistan.

The most interesting statement he made was that he does not believe Pakistan was under the control of China; he said that Pakistan is a large country that has multifaceted ties with different states. Perhaps he was trying to justify Moscow’s recent defence-related talks, which the Taliban regime’s defence minister, Mullah Yaqoob, used as a counter-response to the Pakistani air strikes inside Afghanistan.

Putin’s message between the lines was that, as Pakistan has multifaceted ties with China, the US, and even Russia, Moscow takes the same approach in engaging with nations. After all, Russia is the only country in the world that has recognised the Taliban regime.

There is little doubt that Pakistan has found its geopolitical strength through cultivating a multi-vector approach and hardly portrays itself as a passive client in its relations with the US or any other power. But every policy has two sides, and nothing comes without a cost. Maintaining a strategic equilibrium requires winning and maintaining trust at a certain level with divergent partners.

For instance, Pakistan-China relations, which Putin mentioned, have entered a new domain. Formally, this became evident on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of bilateral relations between the two countries, when Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership visited Beijing and signed several MoUs.

This speaks volumes: Sino-Pak relations have entered a critical new strategic phase, with these ties deepening. China is increasingly seeking to keep Pakistan firmly within its sphere of influence, shifting away from purely economic projects like CPEC towards enhanced defence and security cooperation. CPEC, which was once central to their bilateral relations, has become a lower priority, even in the context of counterterrorism cooperation.

Ultimately, while China reaffirmed its commitment to provide a robust security shield, Pakistan remains responsible for its own internal economic stability and administrative reforms. While China offers significant guarantees of Pakistan’s national sovereignty, this transition creates a complex dilemma for Pakistan as it attempts to balance its ties with Western powers such as the US.

Unlike Russia, China is playing more smartly to project itself as a major global power and to engage nations of the Global South through several initiatives, such as the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, Global Civilisation Initiative and Global Governance Initiative.

While engaging nations in such initiatives, it develops bilateral frameworks of cooperation that bind countries into its broader political partnership. There should be no harm in this, but through such initiatives, China is challenging the existing Western political and security order without provoking direct confrontation. Pakistan has recently signed all the MoUs under these initiatives, which Beijing depicts as Pakistan agreeing to remain within its sphere of influence. This is the tricky part. A nation that maintains multifaceted relationships hardly follows such ideologically driven political initiatives.

Putin finds Pakistan another window through which to engage and send messages to Washington.

Russia also maintains multifaceted ties and is seeking to maintain equilibrium with China, India and Pakistan. However, what is common to China and Russia is the challenge posed by the US. As long as the US remains engaged in West Asia, both China and Russia benefit, as this increases their economic and political strength, while weakening US interests. Most importantly, President Donald Trump’s attention may not turn to Afghanistan, especially the Bagram base, which he has his eyes on. In this context, Pakistan is perceived as a US partner, but Beijing has its apprehensions.

If Russia-Taliban cooperation deepens, the US might need to rethink Afghanistan’s status, including sanctions on Taliban assets and its counterterrorism strategy. However, one view is that Washington now has limited leverage, and that maintaining good ties with Pakistan remains its main avenue for influencing Afghan affairs.

If not Cuba, or even after Cuba, Trump would certainly create an uproar around the Bagram base, and Russia is talking about a defence deal with the Taliban, even if initially it is related only to repairing old equipment under the May 27, 2026, agreement on “military-technical cooperation” signed between Russia and the Taliban.

However, any defence deal with the Taliban will be viewed suspiciously, as a stronger Taliban could mean more terrorism in Pakistan. Though Russia is also concerned about terrorist networks in Afghanistan, it may prefer the broader strategic advantage.

Paradoxically, Pakistan has gradually become important to Moscow for another reason — its proactive role in the ongoing mediation between Iran and the US. Putin finds Pakistan another window through which to engage and send messages to Washington.

Russia has improved ties with Pakistan without endangering its core relationship with India. Yet, in recent years, Russia has cautiously courted Pakistan. Pakistan views Russia from a longer geopolitical perspective and knows that until Russia’s strategic and defence partnership with India weakens sufficiently, or India’s defence and strategic alliance with the US increases to a level that forces Moscow to review its India policy, Pakistan can afford to wait and see how this equilibrium is maintained.

The perception is accurate that Pakistan is not fully under China’s control, and Beijing also wants to keep Pakistan within its sphere of influence. However, their strategic partnership will outlast economic collaborations, during which both sides will continue to pursue divergent policies.

Pakistan will remain relevant to the US and Europe while maintaining close ties with West Asia, and China will continue to view these relations with suspicion. But, in the end, their strategic and geopolitical partnership will remain constant. Russia does not enjoy such privilege in India’s case.

The writer is a security analyst.

Published in Dawn, June 7th, 2026